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STRINGS ATTACHED: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ERUV
UNDER THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT
ALEXANDRA LANG SUSMAN
"Now, you have built this eruv in Washington, and the
territory it covers includes the Capitol, the White
House, the Supreme Court and many other Federal
buildings. By permitting Jewish families to spend more
time together on the Sabbath, it will enable them to
enjoy the Sabbath more and promote traditional family
values, and it will lead to a fuller and better life for the
entire Jewish community in Washington. I look upon
this work as a favorable endeavor."' - President
George H. W. Bush in 1990 at the inauguration of the
Washington D.C. eruv
"Miami Beach Riddle: What's held together with string,
can turn an eight-square-mile island into a private
home, and has civil libertarians tied in knots? Give up?
The eruv." 2 - Reporter, commenting on the Miami
Beach eruv controversy
I. INTRODUCTION
There are over one hundred thirty eruvim 3 in the United
States,4 serving many Orthodox Jewish communities in the nation.5
Copyright © 2009 by Alexandra Lang Susman.
. Associate, Munger, Tolles & Olson, LLP; Ph.D. Candidate, Stanford University; J.D.,
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1. Dan Rattiner, Unconstitutional? A Battle Over Mothers with Baby Carriages in
Westhampton Beach, available at
http://www.danshamptons.com/content/danspapers/issue3l_2008/01 .html.
2. Gaspar Gonzalez, Orthodox Jews In Miami Beach Consider It a Harmless Symbol,
But Others Believe It Violates The U.S. Constitution, MIAMI NEW TIMES, Feb. 21, 2002.
3. An "eruv" (plural, "eruvim") is an enclosed space, or legal boundary, that permits
Orthodox Jews to carry objects outside their home on the Sabbath, thus avoiding a Rabbinic
prohibition against carrying within the public domain. YOSEF GAVRIEL BECHHOFER, THE
CONTEMPORARY ERUV: ERUVIM IN MODERN METROPOLITAN AREAS 6-9 (1998). For further
explanation of an eruv and its place in Jewish law, see infra Part 1.
4. Marcella Bernhard, Tangled Up In Eruv, PALO ALTO WEEKLY, Dec. 15, 1999.
5. See id.
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Many Americans living in urban areas reside within eruvim and do not
even know it.6 Many others, knowing about the eruv in their
neighborhood or an Orthodox Jewish community's desire to erect an
eruv, have used the legal system, the press and the street corner to
decry the presence, or potential presence, of an eruv in their
community. Responses to eruvim conflate religious, political, legal
and visceral discourses, oftentimes making it problematic to separate
the legal issues at stake from the cultural, social and historical realities
of the communities at issue.
An eruv is an enclosed space, or legal boundary, that permits
Orthodox Jews to carry objects outside their home on the Sabbath, thus
avoiding a Rabbinic prohibition against carrying within the public
domain. It also grants disabled or incapacitated people who depend on
crutches, canes, walkers or wheelchairs and parents of toddlers who
must be wheeled in baby carriages or strollers freedom of movement
on the Sabbath, since such activities, absent an eruv, are considered
"carrying" and are thus impermissible. 8 In order to satisfy Jewish law,
the eruv must be at least forty inches high, roofless, and continuous
(without gaps).9 Traditionally, an eruv would follow the natural
features of a city.' 0 Today, in creating an eruv, a local government
usually allows the Orthodox community to string wires along utility
poles to fill the gaps where creek beds or freeway sound walls do not
already establish a usable boundary.'' Constructed eruvim rely on the
use of public property such as utility poles and power lines, as they
surround both private premises and public streets. Another
requirement of an eruv is that its boundaries bear a resemblance to a
string of doorways. 12 This is achieved by attaching black rubber-
6. Diane Wedner, Kindred Spirits Can Call This Place Home, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17,
2006. For example, the Los Angeles Metropolitan eruv stretches across approximately eighty
square miles, from Hollywood and the Adams District on the East side of its boundary, to
Rancho Park on the South side of its boundary, to Brentwood and Sherman Oaks on the West
side of its boundary, and to the 101 Freeway on the North side of its boundary. Id. See also
Appendix 1.
7. BECHHOFER, supra note 3, at 6-9.
8. See Joshua Metzger, Note, The Eruv: Can Government Constitutionally Permit Jews
to Build a Fictional Wall Without Breaking the Wall Between Church and State, 4 NAT'L
JEWISH L. REV. 67,69 (1989).
9. See Richard T. Foltin, Smith v. Community Board No. 14: The Rockaway "Eruv"
Case, THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE NATIONAL AFFAIRS BACKGROUNDER, Sept. 19, 1985.
10. See Metzger, supra note 8, at 68.
I1. See http:/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eruv.
12. Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d 142, 146 (D.N.J.
2001).
STRfNGS ATTACHED
coated casings, or lechis, to horizontal wires, creating the sides of a
symbolic doorway.' 
3
Besides the physical requirements of the eruv, there is a
mandatory legal component that is required as well. In order to create
a valid eruv under Jewish law, a secular official with jurisdiction over
the area in question must issue a ceremonial governmental
proclamation "leasing" the enclosed public and private property to the
Jewish community for a small fee.' 4 Leasing is essential because it
permits Orthodox Jews to treat a whole city, or the portion of a city
that is enclosed in an eruv's space, as if it were a single household,
symbolically converting the public domain into private domain. 1
5
Since an eruv converts the public space within its boundaries,
including the private homes, public schools, parks and shops into
private religious space and "property" of the Orthodox Jewish
community, its very existence implicitly pervades every aspect of the
lives of those who live within its borders. While some see an eruv as
''a virtually invisible boundary line indistinguishable from the utility
poles and telephone wires in the area,',' 6 others see it as a personal
offense that forces all citizens in the area to live within an Orthodox
Jewish religious enclosure. 17 An eruv, then, brings to the fore the
conflict between two overlapping legal paradigms: Rabbinic law and
American Constitutional law, specifically the First Amendment. The
implications of this tension are most apparent when examining
whether the erection of an eruv, with all its Rabbinic reqWuirements,
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment or stands
as a religious freedom right guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment.' 9 While the clauses work in tandem to protect
freedom of religious belief and actions, there is often a tension
between the two.2° As Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has explained,
13. Id. at 142. See also Sherry Colb, The Boundary Between Neutrality and Hostility
Toward Religion: The Recent Third Circuit Decision About the Tenafly Eruv, Nov. 6, 2002,
available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20021i06.html.
14. See BECHHOFER, supra note 3, at 113. See also Colb, supra note 13.
15. See Mitchell Zimmerman & Joel Beinin, Beware of the Symbolism of Approving an
Eruv, PALO ALTO WEEKLY, Mar. 22, 2000.
16. See Smith v. Cmty. Bd. No. 14, 491 N.Y.S.2d 584, 587 (Sup, Ct. 1985).
17. See Bernhard, supra note 4.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..
19. Id.
20. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1140
(2002). See generally Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment:
Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673 (1980) (discussing the tension between the
two clauses); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. I
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"Government actions to facilitate free exercise might be challenged as
impermissible establishments, and government efforts to refrain from
establishing religion might be objected to as denying the free exercise
of religion." 21 With challenges and objections on both sides of the eruv
debate, the "almost invisible" boundary of an eruv has created an
impenetrable wall for many communities throughout the United States.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect within the eruv debate is the
relative ease with which courts and commentators have either
dismissed the constitutional issues surrounding an eruv, utterly ignored
the issues of government entanglement necessary for the construction
of an eruv, or failed to account for the burdens placed on Orthodox
Jews absent an eruv, especially parents with children and the elderly,
disabled or incapacitated. The few legal scholars who have written on
the subject of an eruv find that it does not violate the Establishment
Clause and is a permissible governmental accommodation of
religion.22 This is also echoed in three of the four eruv cases that have
been decided in court.23 Although later overturned by the Third
Circuit, only one court to date has found the construction of an eruv
unconstitutional.24
More frequent are decisions throughout the country, by
individual city councils, that either reject or accept the construction of
an eruv with little legal debate or reference to the constitutional issues
at stake. Even the communities that do struggle with the
constitutionality of an eruv, in making their decision as to whether or
not to permit it, often find the legal landscape unclear. For example, in
Palo Alto, California, the site of a highly contentious eruv struggle,
City Attorney Ariel Calonne advised the City Council to "vote with
their hearts" when making the decision about whether to grant
permission for an eruv, since the legal precedents were so
ambiguous. Even more problematic, constitutional historianProfessor Jack N. Rakove, a proponent of the Palo Alto eruv, made the
(1986) (arguing that an accommodation approach brings much needed consistency to the
Religion Clauses' jurisprudence, thus solving the problem of the tension between the clauses).
However, in the case of an eruv, there is not a tension between the Clauses, since neither
Clause would require a local government to permit an eruv. See infra Parts Ill-IV.
21. CHEMERINSKY,supra note 20, at 1140.
22. See Metzger, supra note 8, at 91. See also Jack N. Rakove, The Eruv:
Constitutionally, the Issues Are Moot, PALO ALTO WEEKLY, Feb. 9, 2000. But see Zimmerman
& Beinin, supra note 15.
23. See Smith v. Cmty. Bd. No. 14,491 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. 1985); ACLU of N.J. v.
City of Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. 1293 (D.N.J. 1987); Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough
of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002).
24. Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.N.J. 2001).
25. Time to Tone Down the Eruv Debate, PALO ALTO WEEKLY, Dec. 22, 1999.
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tautological argument of pointing to the sheer number of eruvim in the
United States to support their constitutionality: "[C]ommon sense
would suggest that the existence of scores of eruvim elsewhere in the
United States would have already tested whether a serious
constitutional problem exists."
26
It is within this debate that this Article will argue that many of
the courts and local governments, in either accepting or rejecting an
eruv, have failed to seriously consider the Establishment Clause or the
Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution. Since an eruv's many
implications have not been considered by the courts, and a thorough
evaluation of an eruv in relation to the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause has not been developed, Orthodox Jewish
communities who seek an eruv, the people who oppose them, and city
councils and other local legislative bodies that make the ultimate
decision in regard to them, lack a constitutional framework in which
they can decide the issue. This Article proposes to articulate this
necessary framework. Part II will detail what an eruv is, its place in
Jewish law, its importance for Orthodox Jewish communities, and the
opposition to it.27 Part III will examine whether government
facilitation of an eruv is a violation of the Establishment Clause of the
28Constitution. Part IV will examine whether government prohibition
of an eruv is a significant burdening of religion, in violation of the
Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution or of the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000. 29 Finally, this Article will
question whether local governments can constitutionally permit the
construction of an eruv, while maintaining its legality under Jewish
law, thus bridging the gap between the two legal paradigms.3 °
II. WHAT IS AN ERUV?
During the 25-hour Sabbath, 3 1 often called by its Hebrew
name, "Shabbat," which begins each week at sundown on Friday and
lasts until nightfall on Saturday, scripture prohibits Orthodox Jews
from partaking in a variety of ordinarily routine activities. 32 There are
26. Rakove, supra note 22.
27. See infra Part i.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See infra Part V.
31. Robert A. Erlandson, Sabbath Made 'Freer'for Orthodox Jews, THE BALTIMORE
SUN, Jan. 16, 1998, at lB.
32. See Gonzalez, supra note 2.
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thirty-nine prohibitions in total, ranging from a prohibition against the
raising or lowering of a flame, which includes turning lights on and
off, to writing with a pen or a computer, to driving.33 One of the most
onerous prohibitions, from a practical standpoint, bars the lifting,
carrying or pushing of objects outside of the private space of the home
on the Sabbath.34 The eruv "creates a legal fiction, which converts the
public domain to a private domain," thereby enabling Orthodox Jews
to engage in a number of activities on the Sabbath that would
otherwise be barred.35 Commonly used articles that would be
prohibited from lifting or carrying without an eruv, but are permitted
to be carried outside the home within an eruv, include baby carriages,
strollers, canes, walkers, wheelchairs, food, prayer books,
handkerchiefs, gloves, rain hats, house keys, and medicines.36 While
observant Jews may live in a place without an eruv, the presence of an
eruv clearly enhances the practice of Orthodox Judaism by allowing
those members of the community with small children and disabilities
to move about freely and to participate in communal worship, and by
allowing other members of the community to continue with their
everyday activities, which include lifting and carrying.
37
This is especially true when it comes to the act of worship.
Orthodox Jewish law requires Jews to pray as a group.38 Without a
group of ten adult 39 males, "Orthodox Jewish law will not permit the
recital of certain prayers nor the public reading of the Torah (Bible)
scroll. Thus, the only way for Orthodox Jews to fulfill their ritual
obligations of Sabbath study and prayer is to either attend synagogue
or gather together ten adult men in a private home. 41 An eruv allows
families with young children (needing to be carried) and the elderly,
33. Id.
34. Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d 142, 146 (D. N.J.
2001).
35. Id.
36. See Los Angeles County Eruv, Eruv Guide, http://www.laeruv.com/eruv-guide (last
visited Apr. 18, 2009). Some items, for example, an umbrella, are still prohibited, even within
an eruv. Id.
37. TenaflyEruvAss'n, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d at 148-49.
38. Brief for Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, et al., as Amici
Curiae Supporting Appellants, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp.
2d 142, 148 (D.N.J. 2001), No. 01-3301, available at http://www.jlaw.com/Briefs/tenafly-
ou.html.
39. In Jewish law, a boy is considered to be an adult at thirteen, while a girl is
considered an adult at age twelve. New World Encyclopedia,
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/BarMitzvah (last visited February 28, 2009).
40. Brief for Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, et al., as Amici
Curiae, supra note 38, at 148.
41. See id.
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disabled or incapacitated (needing the aid of a walker, wheelchair or
cane) who could not otherwise leave the private space of their home,
to attend synagogue or to gather at a neighbor's home.42 Therefore, it
is not surprising that many Orthodox synagogues advertise in Jewish
journals that they are located within an eruv to increase attendance and
membership.43 As one Rabbi explained, "We want to entice Orthodox
Jews to move into our area. We are trying to revive the area for
observant Jews. We are trying to advertise that the eruv is here.
' 44
Further, the presence of an eruv has become a factor in some real
estate markets.4 5 In some areas, a home's location within an eruv can
increase its price by as much as ten percent.
46
The concept of an eruv dates back to the time of King
Solomon.47 It is not, as some critics of the eruv have argued, a modem
day loophole created to get around a Sabbath requirement, but rather,
48it is a prescribed alternative. Indeed, "a scholar of Jewish law would
find it unremarkable that the Talmud49 contains both a prohibition
against carrying on the Sabbath and a procedure for modifying that
prohibition." 50 An entire body of Jewish law has developed which
delineates in great detail the manner in which an eruv must be erected
and maintained in order for it to conform to the requirements of Jewish
law.5 1 In order to maintain an eruv, members of the observant
community must continuously check its boundaries to ensure there
have been no breaks so it is intact for Shabbat. 52 Some eruvim have a
hotline number that observant Jews can call to make sure that the eruv
42. Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 152 (3d Cir. 2002).
43. See Metzger, supra note 8, at 86 n. 143.
44. Erlandson, supra note 31, at I B.
45. See Sarah Schweitzer, When Faith, Real Estate Converge, THE BOSTON GLOBE, May
29, 2005
46. Id.
47. See BECHHOFER, supra note 3, at 7.
48. Id. at 10.
49. See Encyclopedia Brittanica,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/581644/Talmud/34863/Definition-of-terms (last
visited February 28, 2009). The Talmud is a collection of Jewish law and tradition. Id.
50. See Calvin Trillin, Drawing the Line, THE NEw YORKER, Dec. 12, 1994, at 5 I.
51. See generally S. EIDER, A SUMMARY OF HALACHOS OF THE ERUV (1968) (outlining in
detail Jewish law surrounding an eruv). See also supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text
(describing the physical requirements of an eruv).
52. See Erlandson, supra note 3 1, at 1 B.
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is intact and thus operational, before leaving the private home.5 3 The
hotline operator is the person designated to check the boundary. 54
In addition to the physical requirements and maintenance of the
eruv, the Jewish community must obtain a resolution from the local
authorities granting the community the right to the public land.55 These
proclamations usually "delineate the geographic area that will be
bounded by the eruv... rent that area to the group seeking to
establish the eruv for the sum of $1.00, . . . [and] clearly state that the
rights to the domain encompassed by the eruv are conveyed for the
sole or limited purpose of pushing and carrying on the Sabbath and
other Jewish holy days."' 56 The governmental proclamation is central to
any discussion of whether or not an eruv violates the First
Amendment.
57
Also central to the eruv debate are community perceptions of
its presence in a multicultural environment. Secular Jews critical of the
eruv contend that it is a "magic schlepping circle" that will "upset the
58balance of the social mix" by creating a Jewish ghetto. For some,
there is a fear that an eruv would allow the Orthodox to "take over" the
community and that there would be a "Jewish tipping" effect.
Perhaps one of the best, if not the most extreme, articulations
of community discomfort regarding an eruv comes from a Tenafly,
New Jersey resident at the first public forum in the Tenafly eruv
debate that would later end in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 59:
This is a very serious concern . . . [a]nd it's a concern
that I have ... that's expressed from, by a lot of people
about a change in the community... It's become a
change in every community where an ultra-orthodox
group has come in. They've willed the change....
53. Id.
54. Id. But see BECHHOFER, supra note 3, at 100-01 ("Most [Rabbis] rule that one
should not attempt to notify the population . . .since many people will be skeptical of a
declaration that the eruv has become invalid and will carry anyway, better that they remain
unaware of their sin than that they be made aware of the possible problem and sin
intentionally.").
55. See id. at 113.
56. Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d 142, 148 (D.N.J.
2001).
57. See infra Part III.B.2.
58. See Trillin, supra note 50, at 56, 60.
59. Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002).
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They've willed it so much so that they've stoned cars
that drive down the streets on the Sabbath.6 °
The language and sentiments expressed by some opponents of
eruvim employ popular stereotypes and anger against a small minority
who was viewed as attempting to impose its religious needs on the
majority. Whether it was a complaint that the town would turn into a
ghetto, that Orthodox Jews would throw stones at cars and block
traffic on the Sabbath, that the school system would be adversely
affected, that many little synagogues would be established, or there
would be a community within a community, the theme was the same:
the eruv would change the character of the community by attracting
more Orthodox Jews who would, in turn, "take over" the town.
Compounding this fear was the notion that the eruv itself was, to some,
"more than a little weird.",6 1
For proponents of the eruv, the anti-eruv rhetoric has the aura
and odor of anti-Semitism. In the mind of many Orthodox Jews, the
opposition seems motivated by a fear that an eruv is "the equivalent of
neon signs that would blink alternately 'Jewish Neighborhood' and
'Strange Orthodox Jews in Funny Clothes Please Come Live Here."'
62
One proponent of the eruv was angered by the community's opposition
to accommodating the Jewish religion since, to her, the current law in
general discriminates against Jews in favor of Christians. 63 She
explained: "As a Jew, I cannot go to the post office on Sunday because
an accommodation has been made for the Christian Sabbath. I am a
teacher, and for me, Christmas and the day of Easter are holidays,
while I have to take Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah 64 as sick
leave.",
65
For other advocates of the eruv, the opposition simply seems
bizarre considering an eruv itself is "virtually invisible. As one
Rabbi explained, "In our tradition, there is the principle that when one
party benefits and the other party loses little or nothing, the first party
60. TenaflyEruvAss'n, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d at 153-54.
61. See Trillin, supra note 50, at 51.
62. Id. at 56.
63. Linda Boroff, Sparks Still Fly as Palo Alto Mulls Decision on Eruv, JEWISH
BULLETIN OF N. CAL, Feb. 18, 2000.
64. Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah are two of the holiest days of the year for the
Jewish community, often referred to as the "High Holy Days." High Holidays,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HighHolidays (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
65. Boroff, supra note 63.
66. Smith v. Cmty. Bd. No. 14, 491 N.Y.S.2d 584, 587 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
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shall be permitted to proceed., 67 That sentiment was echoed with a
secular twist by a nonobservant Jewish publisher who stated, "Sure it's
absurd and irrational to believe that your life is going to be changed by
the presence of a wire, but it's even more absurd and irrational to
oppose it."
68
Both sides of the debate have labeled the other irrational and
characterized the respective motivations of their opponents as
nefarious. Interestingly enough, as the discourse of the debate becomes
more contentious, both sides move away from their legal arguments
and towards the language of difference, extremism, inclusion and
exclusion, insiders and outsiders, and ultimately arrive at opposing
visions of what it means to be "American." The eruv becomes a
snowballing signifier for current debates on pluralism,
multiculturalism and the place of religion in society. Thus, by
reframing the issue in legal terms, and offering a constitutional
framework within which the debate can be rearticulated, this Article
may offer the communities struggling with the decision of whether to
allow the construction of an eruv a way to actually communicate and
come to a decision.
III. ERUVIM AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Before examining whether an eruv violates the Establishment
Clause,69 it is important to outline the case history of EstablishmentClause jurisprudence.
A. Case History of the Establishment Clause
Although the Supreme Court claims not to be confined to a
single analytical framework for Establishment Clause cases, the Court,
until 1980, predominantly used an analysis developed in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.70 In Lemon, the Court confronted the question of whether a
state could reimburse church-affiliated schools for teachers' salaries,
instructional materials, and textbooks when those expenses were
related to the teaching of secular subjects, or whether those
67. Trillin, supra note 50, at 51.
68. Id.
69. The Establishment Clause provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
70. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 239 (1994).
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reimbursements would violate the Establishment Clause.7' The Court
explained that the purpose of the Establishment Clause is to protect
against three "main evils": "sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity., 72 In order to
protect the constitutional guarantees afforded by the Establishment
Clause, the Court articulated a three part test to be applied to
government action: "First, the [action] must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the [act] must not foster
'an excessive government entanglement with religion'. 73 Applying
the three part test, the Court held that both state statutes at issue
violated the entanglement prong of the analysis and declared them
unconstitutional.74
According to Professor Ira C. Lupu, "By purporting to capture
the Establishment Clause in a three-part test for all seasons-including
a prohibition not only on governmental practices that advance religion
but also on practices that interact significantly with religious
institutions-Lemon promised that separationism would be the
guiding force of Religion Clause adjudication." 75 That is, according to
Lemon, church and state are to be strictly separated.
Although there have been instances where the Court decided
Establishment Clause cases without applying the Lemon test,76 it has
been frequently used. 77 While Lemon has not been repudiated-and
was recently reaffirmed&8-a number of the Justices currently on the
Court have criticized it. 79 Justice Scalia, the primary advocate for
overruling the test, articulates perhaps one of the most colorful
critiques of the Court's use of Lemon:
71. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 609-10.
72. Id. at 612 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
73. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
74. Id. at615.
75. Lupu, supra note 70, at 236.
76. Id. at 239-40.
77. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 603 n.4 (1992) (Blackman, J., concurring)
(listing the 31 Establishment Clause cases decided between 1971 and 1992 where the Court
applied Lemon).
78. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 861-63 (2005) (specifically
declining a request to abandon Lemon's purpose test).
79. Id. at 890 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "a majority of the Justices on the
current [2005] Court... have repudiated the brain-spun 'Lemon test..."'); GEOFFREY R. STONE,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 525 (1999); Robert C. Stelle, Comment, Religious Freedom in the
Twenty-First Century: Life Without Lemon, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 657, 664 (1999) (detailing
various Justices' criticisms of Lemon).
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Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that
repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after
being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again ....
Over the years, however, no fewer than five of the
currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions,
personally driven pencils through the creature's
heart .... The secret of the Lemon test's survival, I
think, is that it is so easy to kill. It is there to scare us
(and our audience) when we wish it to do so, but we
can command it to return to the tomb at will. When we
wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it;
when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore
it entirely .... Such a docile and useful monster is
worth keeping around, at least in a somnolent state; one
never knows when one might need him. For my part, I
agree with the long list of constitutional scholars who
have criticized Lemon and bemoaned the strange
Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines and
wavering shapes its intermittent use has produced. 80
Despite this critique, the Court's uneven use of the Lemon test,s8 and
its genuine erosion within case law,82 several of the lower courts in the
eruv cases to be litigated have used the test in their determinations.
8 3
Lynch v. Donnelly8 4 has been characterized as a turning point
away from the Lemon test and as a further step in its erosion. ' In
Lynch, the Court confronted the issue of "whether the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment prohibits a municipality from
including a creche, or Nativity scene, in its annual Christmas
display."86 The Christmas display at issue consisted of holiday
decorations and figures, including "a Santa Claus house, reindeer
pulling Santa's sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers,
cutout figures representing such characters as a clown, an elephant,
80. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-99
(1993) (citations omitted).
81. See generally Lupu, supra note 70.
82. Id.
83. See Smith v. Cmty. Bd. No. 14, 491 N.Y.S.2d 584, 586 (Sup. Ct. 1985); ACLU of
N.J. v. City of Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. 1293, 1295 (D.N.J. 1987); but see Tenafly Eruv
Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 175-76 (3d Cir. 2002).
84. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
85. See Lupu, supra note 70, at 239.
86. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670-71.
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and a teddy bear, hundreds of colored lights, a large banner that tread]
'SEASONS GREETINGS,' and the creche at issue" in the case. 8 7 The
city owned all of the display's components. 88 The Court, in an opinion
by Chief Justice Burger, held that the nativity scene did not violate the
Establishment Clause because it was motivated by the "secular
purpose" of celebrating Christmas. 89 The fact that Christmas is a
commemoration of the birth of Jesus Christ and is only celebrated by
Christians, and not adherents of other religions or nonadherents of any
religion, was never addressed in the opinion. Burger's view seemed
particularly problematic to Justice Brennan, a dissenter, who argued
that the creche was a religious symbol and consequently violated all
three prongs of the Lemon test.90 Although the majority said it was
using the Lemon test, it simultaneously refused to apply the test in all
Establishment Clause cases.
9 1
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Lynch decision is
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion that "represents the genesis of
[her] establishment clause analysis"-the endorsement test-offered
as a clarification, or addition, to the Lemon test.92 The endorsement
test collapses the "purpose" and "effect" prongs of the Lemon test into
a single question.9 3  According to Justice O'Connor, "The
Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to
a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political
community." 94 The government violates the Establishment Clause
when there is either "excessive entanglement with religious
institutions" or when there is an impression of "government
endorsement or disapproval of religion." 95 According to Justice
O'Connor, the message of government endorsement or disapproval is
87. Id. at 671.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 685.
90. Id at 698-704 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 679 ("[W]e have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to
any single test or criterion in this sensitive area.").
92. See Metzger, supra note 8, at 77. For favorable readings of Justice O'Connor's
approach, see Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under
the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice 0 'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C. L.
REV. 151 (1986); Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Clauses,
Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151
(1987). But see Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions:
Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987).
93. Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).
94. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 687-88.
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to be analyzed according to the "objective" observer. 96 The concern,
here, is "with the individual alienation, or feelings of exclusion, that an
observer of a government-sponsored religious symbol might
experience. ' 97 As Justice O'Connor explains, "Endorsement sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.
Disapproval sends the opposite message." 9
8
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU,99 the symbolic endorsement
test was applied in a highly fractured Court opinion written by Justice
Blackmun.r ° ° The case concerned two different religious displays: a
creche that was placed in a display case in a county courthouse
staircase, and a display in front of a government building that included
a large Christmas tree, a large menorah, and a sign honoring liberty. 
10 1
Three Justices-Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall-applied the Lemon
test, and argued that both displays were unconstitutional. 10 2 Four
Justices-Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, and White-found both
displays constitutional. ° 3 Justice Blackmun applied the symbolic
endorsement test, articulated by Justice O'Connor in Lynch, and found
that the menorah was constitutional, but the nativity scene was not.10 4
The menorah, in this view, was permissible because it accompanied a
Christmas tree and a secular sign concerning liberty. 105 In contrast, the
nativity scene was alone on government property and could be
perceived by an "objective" observer as a government endorsement of
Christianity, thus "mak[ing] religion relevant, in reality or public
perception, to status in the political community."1
0 6
In Lynch and County ofAllegheny, the Court was responding to
governmental placement of religious displays on government
property. 107 In Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,0 8
96. Id. at 690; Metzger, supra note 8, at 77.
97. Lupu, supra note 70, at 241.
98. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
99. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
100. Id. at 597.
101. Jd. at 578.
102. Id. at 654-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104. Id. at 598-602,620-21.
105. See id. at 613-14, 620.
106. Id. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
107. Id. at 578. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670-71.
108. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
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the issue revolved around the refusal of a state agency to allow the
private placement of a cross by the Klu Klux Klan in a park across
from the state capitol.'0 9 The Court, in a plurality opinion by Justice
Scalia, emphasized that the First Amendment's protection of speech
includes religious expression and held that excluding the cross was
impermissible content-based discrimination.' 0
Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, articulated that the central question was whether the cross
would be perceived by a reasonable observer as the government's
symbolic endorsement of religion."' In essence, Justice O'Connor's
symbolic endorsement test turns on the perspective of the person that
is viewing or judging the government act-the "reasonable observer."
Is this person an adherent of the religion in question, an adherent of a
different religion, or a nonadherent? Justice O'Connor did not discuss
the religious point-of-view of the reasonable observer, but she
characterized the reasonable observer as a "hypothetical observer who
is presumed to possess a certain level of information that all citizens
might not share."' 12 That is, the reasonable observer is "aware of the
history and context of the community and forum in which the religious
display appears" and how the public space has been used by the
community in the past." 3 Using this standard, Justice O'Connor found
that the erection of the Ku Klux Klan's cross would have been
constitutional if it had had a sign disclaiming governmental
sponsorship or endorsement.14 Under these circumstances, a
reasonable observer would recognize that there was no state approval
of the religious message. 115
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, criticized Justice
O'Connor's articulation of the reasonable observer 16 and deemed the
Klan's cross unconstitutional because:
109. Id. at 758-59.
110. Id. at 769-70.
111. Id. at 777 (O'Connor, ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
112. Id. at 780. What this means in practice, however, is far from clear.
113. Id. at 780-81.
114. Id. at 776 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Her 'reasonable person' comes off as a well-
schooled jurist, a being finer than the tort-law model ... It strips of constitutional protection
every reasonable person whose knowledge happens to fall below some 'ideal' standard.
Instead of protecting only the 'ideal' observer, then, I would extend protection to the universe
of reasonable persons and ask whether some viewers of the religious display would be likely
to perceive a government endorsement.").
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The very fact that a sign is installed on public property
implies official recognition and reinforcement of its
message. That implication is especially strong when the
sign stands in front of the seat of the government itself.
The "reasonable observer" of any symbol placed
unattended in front of any capitol in the world will
normally assume that the sovereign-which is not only
the owner of that parcel of real estate but also the
lawgiver for the surrounding territory-has sponsored
and facilitated its message. 117
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of Justice O'Connor's articulation
is her refusal to address the fact that the objective observer test
"measures objectivity against the backdrop of a Christian society."' 18
As Professor Kathleen M. Sullivan explains: "Majority practices are
myopically seen by their own practitioners as uncontroversial; asking
predominantly Christian courts to judge the exclusionary message of
creches may be a little like asking an all-male jury to judge a woman's
reasonable resistance in a rape case. ' 19
The inconsistency of the decisions of Lemon, Lynch, County of
Allegheny and Pinette indicates that there is no agreement on the Court
as to when religious symbols are allowed on government property,
what standard should apply, or whose perspective should be employed
when applying the given standard. 
120
B. Does an Eruv Violate the Establishment Clause?
1. The Eruv and the Lemon Test
Two courts to date have analyzed the eruv under the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution. 12, Both courts purported to
117. Id. at801-02.
118. Anjali Sakaria, Worshipping Substantive Equality over Formal Neutrality: Applying
the Endorsement Test to Sect-Specific Legislative Accommodations, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 483,492 (2002).
119. Id. at 492 n.49 (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 197 (1992)).
120. Similar inconsistencies appeared in two cases handed down on the same day
concerning public displays of the Ten Commandments. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545
U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). Because those cases turned upon
the special circumstances surrounding the place of the Ten Commandments in American
history, their substantive discussions are not addressed herein.
121. See Smith v. Cmty. Bd. No. 14,491 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. 1985); ACLU of N.J. v.
City of Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. 1293 (D.N.J. 1987).
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apply the Lemon test and both found the eruv to be constitutional.' 22
However, neither court provided adequate analysis or justification for
its reasoning. Indeed, the courts' arguments are unpersuasive at best
and outcome-determinative at worst. A thorough analysis of the eruv
demonstrates that it fails each prong of the Lemon test and is thus
unconstitutional.
In the first case, Smith v. Community Board No. 14, the
Plaintiff, Joseph M. Smith, sought a permanent injunction to restrain
the local Orthodox Jewish community "from further construction,
maintenance and use of an eruv," claiming that his Establishment
Clause rights had been violated. 123 Smith's primary claim was that
encircling the area by a "religious device ... will force [him] and other
residents to assume special burdens to avoid. The only way to avoid
this unwelcomed and unwanted religious device and the resultant
religious aura and metaphysical impact in the area would be to move
away...",124 The Orthodox Jewish community had been given
permission to construct the eruv by the Community Board and by the
New York City Department of Parks and Recreation. 125 The eruv
encompassed ninety blocks, utilized sixty-three New York City lamp
poles, and resulted in the necessary rebuilding of sea walls across ten
city streets so they would reach the forty inch height minimum of the
eruv. 126 The construction of the eruv cost $18,000, which the Orthodox
community entirely financed. 1
27
In the second case, ACLU v. City of Long Branch, the facts
were similar and the outcome the same, the only difference being that
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), rather than a private
individual, brought the action. 128 The ACLU also argued that "an eruv
constitutes the placement of [a] 'permanent symbol"' of the Jewish
122. See Smith, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 586-87; Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. at 1295-97.
123. Smith, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 584-85.
124. Id. at 585. See also Glen 0. Robinson, Communities, 83 VA. L. REV. 269, 298 (1997)
("[T]o anyone who believes in communitarianism, in a sense of collective purpose and even
collective identity, the claim [of "metaphysical impact" and "religious aura") cannot be
dismissed out of hand. The undeniable effect of creating the eruv was not simply to make it
more convenient for Orthodox Jews to observe Sabbath; it was also to give the neighborhood
an identity as a Jewish community.").
125. Smith, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. ACLU of N.J. v. City of Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. 1293, 1293 (D.N.J. 1987). The
other eruv case that has reached the courts is Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly,
155 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.N.J. 2001), rev'd, 309 F.3d 144 (3d. Cir 2002). However, the courts in
the Tenafly case relied more on a free speech rationale. See generally Eli Greenbaum, Note,
First Amendment Inversions, I l I YALE L.J. 1861 (2002).
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religion on public property" thus violating the Establishment
Clause.129
In applying the first prong of the Lemon test-secular
purpose-the Smith court held that the requirement had been satisfied
since, by permitting the erection of an eruv, the City had obtained the
benefit of an enlargement of the sea fences.' 30 The problem with this
argument is that the government obtaining a benefit seems to have
little to do with whether the religious symbol had a secular purpose or
not. Under the court's reasoning, if a particular religion wanted to erect
a giant statue of its founder in front of the state house, and in the
process repainted the building, this would satisfy the secular purpose
prong since the government was receiving a benefit. Particular
religious groups cannot be permitted to "buy off' constitutional
protections in the name of government benefits.
The Long Branch court found that the erection of the eruv
satisfied the secular purpose prong since an eruv's function is to allow
observant Jews to engage in secular activities-going to the park,
pushing a baby carriage, visiting friends-on the Sabbath.131 The court
declared that the secular purpose of the resolution that granted the eruv
was that "it allow[ed] a large group of citizens access to public
properties."'132 The court analogized government allowance of an eruv
to the government assisting religious organizations in other ways, such
as providing police during large outdoor religious gatherings and to
direct traffic in synagogue or church parking lots, repairing sidewalks
outside of religious organizations, or installing additional streetlights
around religious buildings to assist worshipers attending evening
services. 133 The court reasoned that "[p]roviding equal access to public
facilities to people of all religions and enabling individuals to get to
and from their chosen places of worship safely are permissible
accommodations by the government."'
34
While seemingly more convincing than the government benefit
analysis of the Smith court, the Long Branch court mischaracterized its
equal access rationale. Fixing sidewalks, directing traffic, and
installing street lights are activities devoid of religious significance.
They are wholly secular acts provided by the government to religious
institutions. Furthermore, when the city fixes sidewalks and directs
129. Long Branch, 670 F.Supp, at 1294.
130. Smith, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 587.





traffic, both adherents and nonadherents to the religious group getting
the accommodation benefit. In other words, a better sidewalk aids all
people walking on it: those who use it to go to and from the religious
institution and those who use it in the course of their daily secular
activities. Similarly, directing traffic outside a busy religious building
aids those attempting to enter and leave for the purpose of worship and
those that are simply driving by. The eruv, in contrast, is a mechanism
of Jewish law that gives benefits to Orthodox Jews alone. An eruv
facilitates religious worship by making it easier for Orthodox Jews to
attend synagogue and move around in general on the Sabbath.
However, it does so by the local government employing a Rabbinic
legal fiction, a religious tool, only meaningful to Orthodox Jews.
Proponents of the eruv could argue that an eruv is wholly
secular in appearance. It is not an object of worship; it is a symbolic
wall, not a symbol of anything Jewish in nature or practice. Further,
while it may facilitate the disabled, the elderly, or parents with small
children in attending synagogue, it plays no active role in religious
observance itself. However, the fact that an eruv may be secular in
appearance has little to do with the first prong of the Lemon test which
requires that it have a secular purpose. The cruv has no secular
purpose whatsoever. Its purpose is to enclose and separate a
designated area in order to satisfy the religious needs of a particular
group of citizens. It is only the religious beliefs of Orthodox Jews that
necessitates the erection of the eruv. Thus, an eruv fails the secular
purpose prong of the Lemon test.
The second prong of the Lemon test demands that the eruv's
primary effect neither advance nor inhibit religion. 135 The Smith court
found the eruv was an accommodation and not an advancement of
religion since the government granted permission to the Orthodox
Jewish community to use public land and poles in just as it had done
so for other religious communities in New York. 136 The court based its
ruling on the fact that the city granted the permits for the eruv pursuant
to its standard rules and regulations, the city did not expend public
funds to construct or maintain the eruv, and the city had no intent to
advance the Jewish faith in particular, or religion in general, by
135. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). An analysis of the second prong
of the Lemon test has often been conflated with a discussion of symbolic endorsement. See,
e.g., Smith, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 587; Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. at 1296. For clarity, the analysis
of the eruv under the symbolic endorsement test is separated from its analysis under the
Lemon test. See infra discussion Part 111.B.2.
136. Smith, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
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granting permission for the construction of the eruv which is "virtually
invisible.'
137
The Long Branch court focused its analysis on the second
prong by asserting that the eruv does not impose any religion or visible
religious symbolism on the other residents of the community. 38 The
court acknowledged the fact that it is impermissible for a government
to construct a religious symbol but concluded that "the eruv itself has
no religious significance or symbolism and is not part of any religious
ritual." 139 Finally, as in Smith, the court held that the city's resolution
allowing the construction of an eruv did not advance or endorse any
religion but instead simply accommodated the religious practices of
observant Jewish residents. 1
40
Both courts and proponents of eruvim in general make much of
the fact that an eruv is practically invisible and is not a visible
religious symbol. However, to say an eruv does not have any religious
significance, as the Long Branch court asserted, is a gross
mischaracterization. While an eruv may be a utilitarian device, it is
religiously prescribed and only has meaning for Orthodox Jews. Its
only significance is religious. At the same time, its wholly secular
appearance and the fact that it can barely be distinguished from
ordinary telephone wires and poles renders the effects of its physical
presence ambiguous. 142 To fully explore the second prong of the
Lemon test relating to the effect of the religious symbol, courts must
go beyond an eruv's visibility.
Any analysis of effects of an eruv must inquire into whether
government allowance of an eruv advances religion. Government
allowance of an eruv does serve to advance religion in that it permits
people who normally would not be able to leave the private domain of
their home, namely parents with small children, the elderly and the
disabled, to attend religious services.' 43 In Estate of Thornton v.
137. Id.
138. Long Branch, 670 F.Supp. at 1295.
139. Id. at 1296.
140. Id.
141. See Brief for ACLU of New Jersey as Amicus Curiae at 12 n.4, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n,
Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.N.J. 2001) (No. Civ. 00-605 1) ("It is hard
to fathom how a concept developed under Jewish law in response to religious prohibitions and
administered under careful rabbinical supervision could be described as having no religious
significance.").
142. For further discussion of the principle of symbolic endorsement, see infra Part
III.B.2.
143. See supra Part II.
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Caldor,144 the Court invalidated a Connecticut law that provided
employees with the absolute right not to work on their chosen
Sabbath.145 The Court held that the law violated the Establishment
Clause because it went "beyond having an incidental or remote effect
of advancing religion ... The statute has a primary effect that
impermissibly advances a particular religious practice.9' 1 46 Similarly,
in the case of the eruv, increased synagogue attendance is a direct
result of the government allowing the Jewish community to construct
and maintain an eruv. 147 Furthermore, this increased attendance could
also result in increased funds for the synagogue.148
One proponent of the eruv has argued that increased attendance
is merely a "secondary or indirect benefit." 149 Under this reasoning,
the eruv is analogous to mandatory Sunday closing laws, which the
Supreme Court upheld in McGowan v. Maryland as constitutional
despite the fact that "one of their undeniable effects was to render it
somewhat more likely that citizens would respect religious institutions
and even attend religious services." 150 The Court found the Sunday
closing laws permissible because the "present purpose and effect of
most of them is to provide a uniform day of rest for all citizens"'
' 51
which was deemed a "secular goal."'15 2 Although McGowan was
decided before the Lemon case, the Court defended its decision in a
post-Lemon case.1
5 3
The difference between an eruv and a Sunday closing law is
that the former is solely a mechanism of Jewish law and practice, and
only has meaning for Orthodox Jews. In contrast, a Sunday closing
law provides a uniform day of rest for all citizens. While a Sunday
144. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
145. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985).
146. Id. at 710 (citation omitted).
147. See Metzger, supra note 8, at 86 n. 143 ("The eruv is often used as an inducement to
convince Jews to become members of a certain synagogue. Advertisements of synagogues and
communities in Jewish weeklies often stress that their community has or is in the process of
constructing an eruv.").
148. See id. at 86 n. 144 ("Temples collect annual membership dues from their
congregants as a means of supporting the synagogues' expenses.").
149. Id. at 85.
150. See id. (citing Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (citing
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961))).
151. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 445.
152. Id.
153. See Metzger, supra note 8, at 85 (citing Comm. for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 756).
Despite the Court's reaffirmation of its decision, it is my contention that a Sunday closing law
should have been deemed an unconstitutional establishment of religion under the second prong
of the Lemon test.
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closing law may have the incidental effect of facilitating religious
practice, the primary purpose of an eruv is to facilitate Orthodox
Judaism by making movement on the Sabbath less burdensome for its
practitioners. Thus, an eruv impermissibly advances a particular
religion thereby violating the Establishment Clause.
The third prong of the Lemon test necessitates that the eruv not
foster an excessive entanglement between the state and religion. 154
Both courts held that excessive entanglement was not created since the
cities in question routinely allowed commercial signs and banners to
be hung from utility poles and permitted public lands to be used for
various activities, religious and nonreligious.' 55 Therefore, the Jewish
community applying for the eruv was treated no differently than other
groups and given no preferential treatment.156 Further, the courts
reiterated that the eruvim were constructed and maintained entirely at
the expense of the Jewish community and the government provided no
aid other than the passage of the resolutions permitting the eruvim. 157
The issue of entanglement is less problematic in the case of an
eruv than it is in the case, for example, of kosher food regulation.
158
Unlike some states' kosher fraud statutes that require states to enforce
"orthodox Hebrew religious requirements," 159 the eruv does not
require the government to regulate or enforce norms of Jewish law on
a continued and sustained basis. However, the eruv does present a
unique kind of entanglement in regard to the necessary government
proclamation that serves to lease the public land to the Jewish
community. The failure on the part of the courts to analyze this aspect
of an eruv is notable since it is the proclamation itself that serves to
entangle the government with religion. 160
Entanglement under the Lemon test implies an ongoing
relationship or an entwinement between secular and religious
institutions. Constitutional historian Professor Jack N. Rakove, a
proponent of the Palo Alto eruv, claimed in an editorial that a
154. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
155. See Smith v. Cmty. Bd. No. 14, 491 N.Y.S.2d 584, 587 (Sup. Ct. 1985); ACLU of
N.J. v. City of Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. 1293, 1297 (D.N.J. 1987).
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See generally Gerald F. Masoudi, Kosher Food Regulation and the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment, 60 U. CHi. L. REV. 667 (1993) (discussing various states' regulations
of kosher food to protect against consumer fraud).
159. See, e.g., Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 418
(2d Cir. 2002).
160. The proclamation may also violate the first and second prong of the Lemon test, but
it is most relevant to a discussion of the entanglement prong and is thus being solely analyzed
in this context.
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proclamation recognizing the existence of the eruv is not entanglement
because it would be "a one-time action that merely confirms what is
otherwise allowed."' 6' In other words, it allows citizens to string wires
across utility poles, which was permitted within the city of Palo Alto.
Professors Joel Beinin and Mitchell Zimmerman responded to this
argument by calling it "wrong both in fact and in law."'162 For them, a
proclamation does not merely grant private individualspermission to
string wires between public utility poles and signs, 163 but instead
serves to "characterize[] these actions as an event with a legal/religious
meaning, which the city is endorsing.' 164 The fact that it is a one-time
event is constitutionally 
irrelevant. u.
The governmental involvement with an eruv is not simply the
granting of permission, but the act of converting public secular space
into religious space. Some government proclamations that contain
numerous references to the Jewish faith and even quote scripture, 66 are
intimately involved in this conversion of public space. Other
proclamations, while still mentioning the Jewish faith and the Jewish
religion, read less as a religious text, and more like a contract.
167
However, even these proclamations involve the government declaring
and defining what Orthodox Jewish law requires of its adherents.
Former President Bush's quote 169  at the inauguration of the
Washington D.C. eruv exemplifies the fact that any formal
government acknowledgement of an eruv both implicitly and explicitly
conflates religion and the government. Thus, the eruv likely fails the
third prong of the Lemon test and should be deemed unconstitutional.
161. Rakove, supra note 22.
162. Mitchell Zimmerman & Joel Beinin, Beware the Symbolism of Approving an Eruv,





166. The proclamation for the Bayside eruv in Queens, New York began as follows:
"WHEREAS, in accordance with the Jewish religion, the laws of Sabbath contain the
Commandment; 'Let no man go out of his place on the Sabbath day' (Exodus 17-19); and a
man's place is defined by (1) specifying certain natural or artificial boundaries, and (2) by
mutual agreement, letting the use of the common domain .... " See Metzger, supra note 8, at
84 n. 136.
167. See Appendix 11.
168. See id. ("WHEREAS, the delineation of an eruv and its construction creates the
legal fiction of a private domain in which observant persons of the Jewish faith are permitted
to carry or push objects from place to place within the defined area during the Sabbath and
other holy days...").
169. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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Based on the analyses above, a court applying the Lemon test
should find that an eruv fails all three of its prongs. However, the
Lemon test has been disfavored in recent years, unevenly applied, and
often conflated with the symbolic endorsement test developed by
Justice O'Connor in Lynch.17 Therefore, any discussion of an eruv's
constitutionality under the Establishment Clause must also include an
analysis of the eruv under the symbolic endorsement test.
171
2. The Eruv and Symbolic Endorsement
Under the symbolic endorsement test, the government violates
the Establishment Clause if it symbolically endorses or disapproves of
a particular religion, thus making religion seemingly relevant to
membership in the political community.' 72 Whether the government
action is endorsing or disapproving of a particular religion is judged
through the eyes of an ordinary observer. 173 The eruv presents a
difficult case because, unlike a cross, menorah, Star of David,
crescent, creche or Christmas tree, it does not on its face symbolize
religious belief or religious identity. Indeed, a woman or man on the
street would presumably not recognize an eruv unless it was pointed
out, and then it would appear to be just a string. Nevertheless, to
someone who is knowledgeable about the subject, aware of both the
history and meaning of an eruv, it is more than just a string.
The analysis of an eruv brings into focus the importance of
how the law constructs the "reasonable or ordinary observer." There
are essentially two views or definitions of who the "reasonable or
ordinary observer" is. If the reasonable observer is defined, in Justice
O'Connor's terms, as one "more informed than the casual
passerby," 174 then an eruv would be much more than just a string. 175
However, if an ordinary observer is defined as just that, an average
man or woman on the street, the eruv is less problematic since it would
170. See supra Part lIl.A for a discussion of the symbolic endorsement test.
171. See infra Part III.B.2.
172. For discussion of the symbolic endorsement test, as developed in case law, see supra
Part III.A.
173. For a critique of the ordinary observer, see supra notes 119-122 and accompanying
text. Although generally approving of the endorsement test, William P. Marshall finds the
"objective observer" standard "incomprehensible." See William P. Marshall, "'We Know It
When We See It " The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495, 537 (1986).
174. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
175. See Brief for ACLU of New Jersey as Amicus Curiae, supra note 144, at 15 ("[T]he
reasonable observer's knowledge is not limited to what superficial visual inspection of the
utility poles would reveal. The observer must also be . . . deemed aware of the religious
provenance of the markings that comprise the eruv.").
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go practically unnoticed, and even when noticed, it would be devoid of
meaning, thus preventing the ordinary observer from believing that
government is advancing the practice of religion. How the reasonable
observer is defined may determine whether a court would find an eruv
constitutional or an unconstitutional endorsement of religion. It is quite
clear that Justice O'Connor's view has prevailed: in Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe,176 the Court articulated that the
relevant inquiry is "whether an objective observer, acquainted with the
text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute [i.e.,
government act], would perceive it as state endorsement of [religious
activity].' 77  That is, O'Conner's reasonable observer assumes
knowledge of both the government act in question and the religious
significance of the act.
The government proclamation required to set up an eruv in a
community presents the most serious problem of government
endorsement. In Pinette, the Court found that a private placement by
the Klu Klux Klan of a cross in a park across from the state capitol
would not be perceived by a reasonable observer as government
endorsement because a sign accompanied it disclaiming governmental
sponsorship or endorsement.178  In contrast, the government
proclamation renting the public space to the Orthodox Jewish
community for the eruv serves as a sign of government endorsement to
the community at large.
However, there is a concern that the symbolic endorsement test
is biased towards the interests of followers of majority religions 7 9
since the ordinary observer is most likely to come from the majority
culture which, in the United States, is Christian. 180 As Professor Lupu
explains:
Customary practices are likely to be accommodated;
unusual ones are less likely to be so treated .... A
regime of accommodation, designed at least in part to
produce substantive equality between nonreligious and
religious interests, is highly likely to privilege
mainstream, well-known religions, or locally dominant
176. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
177. Id. at 308 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment)) (alterations added).
178. For firther discussion of Pinette, see supra notes 108-119 and accompanying text,
179. See Sakaria, supra note 118, at 486.
180. See supra text accompanying note 89 (discussing Chief Justice Burger's opinion that
celebrating Christmas is a secular activity).
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ones, and thereby to aggravate conditions of religious
inequality. 181
While religious inequality is a valid concern, it should not be used as a
rationale to argue that since an eruv is nearly invisible and not well
known to most, 1 2 it is of de minimis constitutional concern. This
interpretation of the doctrine "would discriminate against religious
symbols or expressions that were too effective or well-known to be
ignored, while at the same time dismissing derisively as "harmless"
those practices or displays whose esoteric nature might render them
understandable only to a relatively small number of observers.'
83
The fact that the endorsement test may have the tendency to
favor dominant religions at some times and at other times favor
minority or lesser known religions underscores the need for courts to
be hyper-vigilant when examining majority and minority religious
practices and symbols to be certain that the reasonable observer
standard is that of a nonadherent. 184 Applying this standard, a
reasonable observer, acquainted with the religious significance of an
eruv, its conversion of the public space into private religious domain,
and the government proclamation leasing public land to the Orthodox
Jewish community, would find a government endorsement of the eruv.
Under both the Lemon test and the symbolic endorsement test,
if a government permitted an Orthodox Jewish community to construct
and maintain an eruv, it would likely violate the Establishment Clause
of the Constitution. However, the inquiry does not end here. The next
step in the analysis of the constitutionality of an eruv is to examine
whether a government prohibition of an eruv would violate the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.1
8 5
181. See Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against
Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555, 586 (1991).
182. See ACLU of N.J. v. City of Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. 1293, 1297 (D.N.J. 1987)
("In all probability residents other than those who actively participated in the initial debate and
those observant Jews who are provided with a map of the eruv's boundaries will never see the
eruv nor will they be able to discern its boundaries."); Smith v. Cmty. Bd. No. 14, 491
N.Y.S.2d 584, 587 (Sup. Ct. 1985) ("The eruv is a virtually invisible boundary line
indistinguishable from the utility poles and telephone wires in the area.").
183. Brief for ACLU of New Jersey as Amicus Curiae, supra note 141, at 16.
184. See generally Sakaria, supra note 118, at 492-93 (arguing that the reasonable
observer in the symbolic endorsement analysis should be that of a nonadherent).
185. See infra Part IV.
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IV. DOES GOVERNMENT PROHIBITION OF AN ERUV VIOLATE THE FREE
EXERCISE CLAUSE OR THE LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED
PERSONS ACT OF 2000?
A Free Exercise Clause claim could arise if an Orthodox
Jewish community applied to their local government for permission,
and the necessary proclamation, to construct an eruv, and the
government either rejected the request or prohibited the Orthodox
community from building or maintaining an eruv.186 Depending upon
the reasoning and context of the government's action, the Orthodox
Jewish community could prevail in their claim. Before examining
whether government action prohibiting an eruv violates the Free
Exercise Clause, it is important to first outline the Court's
jurisprudence surrounding the Clause and Congress' reaction to that
jurisprudence through the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000.
A. Case History of the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
Although the Free Exercise Clause could be, and has been,
interpreted differently in the past, today it protects only against
government actions that "target religious practice for regulation."' 187 In
1990, in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that
the Free Exercise Clause only requires that religion practices not be
unfairly signaled out for different treatment. Accordingly, if a
particular religious practice is barred based on a neutral law, which
applies to everyone equally, that neutral law will stand, even if it
burdens a particular religion or religious practice. 189 Thus, the present
scope of the Free Exercise Clause is quite narrow. 190
The Supreme Court did not formulate a test for the Free
Exercise Clause until the 1960s, although prior to that time, it did find
laws that proscribed solicitation for religious purposes or that taxed
solicitation to be unconstitutional because they infringed on the
186. See infra Part IV.B for an example of an Orthodox community bringing a Free
Exercise claim after a local government ordered it to dismantle its eruv.
187. See Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 71,
71-72 (2001).
188. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882
(1990).
189. See id. at 879.
190. See Tushnet, supra note 187, at 72.
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freedoms of speech and religion.191 However, in 1963 case of Sherbert
v. Verner, the Court articulated a test for the Free Exercise Clause.1
92
In Sherbert, a woman was denied unemployment benefits when she
was discharged from her job for refusing to work on the Sabbath.
193
The Court held that strict scrutiny should be used in evaluating laws
burdening the free exercise of religion and declared the denial of
unemployment benefits unconstitutional under the facts. 194 As
Professor Lawrence G. Sager explains, "Taken at face value, Sherbert
thus gave persons motivated by their religious beliefs a presumptive
right to disregard laws they deemed to obstruct religiously-motivated
conduct, laws that all other persons were required to obey."
19 5
For the next twenty-seven years, the Court usually asserted that
it was applying strict scrutiny to Free Exercise Clause claims,' 96 while
paradoxically finding for the government when individuals challenged
laws that allegedly infringed on their right to freely exercise their
religion. 197 The reason for this unusual judicial posture is that the rule
of Sherbert,198 if applied, would have "give[n] religiously motivated
persons a presumptive right to disregard otherwise valid laws" and it
would have "privileged religious commitments over other deep and
valuable human commitments. 199 Thus, the Court did not consistently
(or often) apply the rule of Sherbert.200 As Sager explains, the rule of
Sherbert was not consistently applied because it "was always an
unattractive constitutional norm-so unattractive that the Supreme
Court could never really abide [by] it."
20 1
Despite the uneven history of the Court's Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence, when it decided Employment Division in 1990, the legal
community was shocked by the scope of the decision. 20 2 In
Employment Division, two members of a Native American Church
were denied unemployment compensation benefits because they had
been dismissed from their positions as drug and alcohol rehabilitation
191. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 1201.
192. 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
193. Id. at 399-401.
194. Id. at 406, 409.
195. Lawrence G. Sager, Panel One Commentary, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURM. AM. L. 9, 9
(2000).
196. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 1201.
197. Id.
198. See supra notes 192-194 and accompanying text.
199. Sager, supra note 195, at 10.
200. See id.
201. Id.
202. Lupu, supra note 70, at 251.
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counselors after they ingested peyote at a Church ceremony. 20 3 The
relevant state agency denied them benefits as a result of a state law
disqualifying persons dismissed for "work-related 'misconduct.'
20 4
The Oregon Supreme Court overturned the agency on the ground that
the statute on which the agency relied impermissibly burdened
individual rights under the Free Exercise Clause.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Oregon
Supreme Court, rejecting the Free Exercise claim and declaring that
regardless of the degree of hardship that a general law may impose
upon religious practice, it would not be declared unconstitutional if it
is a "neutral law of general applicability." 20 6 As Justice Scalia
explained, "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of
the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes). ' ' 20 7 Thus, a law or
regulation that infringes upon religious liberty need not serve a
compelling state interest by the means least restrictive to religious
liberty, but is instead only required to meet rational basis and
208demonstrate an absence of anti-religious intent. However, the Court
suggested in dictum that "although exemptions from neutral laws of
general applicability are not required, they can be granted through the
political process., 20 9  The Court acknowledged that "'leaving
accommodation to the political process will place at a relative
disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in,'
but preferred this to 'judges weigh[ing] the social importance of all
laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.',
2 10
Congress attempted to reinstate the pre-Employment Division,
strict scrutiny standard of protection of religious exercise by enacting
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993.21 RFRA was
criticized by one scholar as "attempt[ing] to make the nominal rule of
Sherbert the actual rule and thereby purport[ing] to 'restore' a regime
203. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 876.
206. See id. at 878-79, 890.
207. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
208. See id. at 890. For example, the Court found a city ordinance that prohibited ritual
sacrifice unconstitutional since it was directed solely at a particular religious sect, see Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
209. Sakaria, supra note 118, at 484 n.6.
210. Masoudi, supra note 158, at 679 n.72 (quoting Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 890).
211. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).
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of religious liberty that had never existed. 2 12 In the 1997 case of City
of Boerne v. Flores,213 the Court reasserted itself by holding that
RFRA was unconstitutional, at least with regard to the states, because
it exceeded the scope of congressional power under Section 5, the
Enforcement Clause, of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2 14
In 2000, Congress again tried to reinstate the strict scrutiny
standard in relation to religious liberty.2 15 The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) prohibits any
substantial burden on land use for religious purposes and on the
religious exercise of institutionalized people unless the government
can demonstrate that the burden served a compelling government
interest and was the least restrictive means of advancing that
216interest. Congress enacted the law pursuant to its power under the
Spending Clause.217 The most important aspect of RLUIPA, for the
case of an eruv, is the land use provision. That provision mandates that
strict scrutiny applies when
[T]he substantial burden is imposed in the
implementation of a land use regulation or system of
land use regulations, under which a government makes,
or has in place formal or informal procedures or
practices that permit the government to make,
individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the
property involved.218
That is, strict scrutiny will apply when the government imposes a
burden on religion based on the way in which the government is
regulating the use of land (e.g., through zoning requirements) or if the
government creates a procedure by which it makes ad hoc
determinations about the way in which the land can be used.
While the Supreme Court has yet to decide a case ruling on the
constitutionality of RLUIPA, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
219upheld the law as constitutional. In Mayweathers v. Newland,
212. Sager, supra note 195, at 12.
213. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
214. See id. at 536. However, the Court's opinion did not declare RFRA unconstitutional
as applied to the federal government. See id. at 529-36.
215. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc
(2000).
216. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(I), 2000cc-I (a).
217. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(2)(A), 2000cc- I (b)( I).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C).
219. See Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Muslim prison inmates sued state prison officials, alleging that prison
rules penalized attendance at Muslim religious services in violation of
RLUIPA."O The Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of RLUIPA
and found that "RLUIPA provides additional protection for religious
worship, respecting that Smith set only a constitutional floor-not a
ceiling-for the protection of personal liberty. Smith explicitly left
heightened legislative protection for religious worship to the political
branches."22 Thus, "the only recourse for individuals holding religious
beliefs that conflict with such laws [of general applicability] is to
petition the legislature for an exemption, or sect-specific legislative
accommodation."222
B. The Eruv and the Free Exercise Clause
Under Employment Division, a neutral law of general
applicability that prohibited the attachment of any item to a utility pole
would not be deemed unconstitutional if it resulted in prohibiting a
Jewish community from constructing an eruv. As long as the law was
applied to all citizens and organizations equally, even if its effects
were to burden the practice of Orthodox Judaism, a court would
uphold the law as constitutional under the current Free Exercise
regime. In Tenafly Eruv Association, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, the
Tenafly Borough Council voted to force the Tenafly Eruv Association,
an Orthodox Jewish group, to remove the lechis (plastic strips) that it
had placed on utility poles in order to construct an eruv. 23 The
Council said that it was enforcing Ordinance 691 which mandated:
"No person shall place any sign or advertisement, or other matter upon
any pole, tree, curbstone, sidewalk or elsewhere, in any public street or
public place, excepting such as may be authorized by this or any other
ordinance of the Borough.,
224
Although the ordinance did not allow officials to make
exceptions to the rule on a case-by-case basis, they often did so.225 For
example, the Council had given its permission to the Chamber of
Commerce for it to attach holiday displays to utility poles, and it had
220. Id. at 1065-66.
221. Id. at 1070 (quoting Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 890).
222. Sakaria, supra note 118, at 483-84.
223. Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145 (D.N.J.
2001).
224. ld. at 160n.15.
225. Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 151 (3d Cir. 2002).
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allowed residents to nail their house number signs to utility poles.
226
The Council had also tacitly consented to allow two churches'
directional signs, bearing crosses, to be attached to the poles.227 The
district court found these inconsistent ad hoc determinations
unproblematic since "the mere fact that some private expression has
occurred in a forum either as the result of government inaction or
limited governmental permission does not open a nontraditional forum
to the public for discourse." 228 Thus, the district court held the
Council's refusal to permit the eruv was constitutionally
permissible.229
The Third Circuit reversed and ordered the trial court to issue a
preliminary injunction against the Borough on the ground that it had
likely violated the Free Exercise Clause. 230 The court held that the
Council's "selective, discretionary application of Ordinance 691
against the [eruv] violate[d] the neutrality principle" and was
"sufficiently suggestive of discriminatory intent" such that strict
scrutiny must be applied. 231 The court held that the Borough's
justifications for prohibiting the eruv-that the eruv was permanent
and religious in nature-failed to meet strict scrutiny and thus its
actions violated the Free Exercise Clause. 232 Under Smith, this is
clearly appropriate since the law prohibiting attachments appeared
neutral, but was not applied equally.
Furthermore, given the animus directed towards Orthodox Jews
throughout the Tenafly eruv debate and many residents' fears that the
eruv would lead to their "take-over" of the town, it appeared as if the
Borough's intent was to discriminate against Orthodox Jews. 233 Even
if the individual Council members were not engaged in stereotyping or
discrimination, it is clear that a large part of the determination to deny
permission to construct the eruv was based on the fact that it was
unpopular with the residents. 234 "Allowing for [] a 'hecklers' veto' in
deciding which [religious] groups will have there [sic] religious beliefs
accommodated, and which will not, would present serious concerns
regarding the rights of religious minorities," and clearly violates the
226. Id. at 151-52.
227. See id. at 151.
228. Tenafly Entv Ass'n, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d at 174.
229. See id. at 191.
230. See Tenafly Env Ass n, Inc., 309 F.3d at 15 ..
231. See id. at 168 (internal quotation marks omitted).
232. See id. at 172, 178.
233. For a discussion of the community reaction, see supra notes 59-65 and
accompanying text.
234. See Brief for ACLU of New Jersey as Amicus Curiae, supra note 141, at 24.
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Free Exercise Clause.235 As the Supreme Court stated in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, "[a]t a minimum, the
protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue
discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or
prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons. 236
Thus, under Employment Division, forcing the Orthodox Jewish
community to take down their eruv violated the Free Exercise Clause.
Since a local government's allowance of an eruv would likely
violate the Establishment Clause, 237 it becomes highly problematic for
a court to remedy a Free Exercise violation. That is, when a court
determines there is a Free Exercise violation, it should not simply
order a local government to allow the construction of an eruv or permit
the community to maintain an eruv that is already intact; one violation
of a constitutional principle should not be remedied at the expense of
another. Instead, a court should rectify the situation by ordering the
local government to enforce its laws equally. In the case of the Tenafly
Borough Association, for example, the association should be ordered
to apply Ordinance 691 to all residents and order the removal of
church signs, holiday decorations and house numbers.
What is less clear under Employment Division is if a local
government intending to prohibit an eruv created a neutral law of
general applicability, which prohibited the attachment of any objects to
utility poles, and equally applied it, would the Council's decision to
deny the eruv be constitutional? It would be quite startling if a local
government could effectively outlaw the presence of an eruv by simply
enacting a seemingly neutral law, regardless of the intent that may
have motivated it. Senators Orrin Hatch and Edward Kennedy have
noted that the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary have
received extensive testimony documenting the use of ostensibly
neutral ordinances by municipal authorities to discriminate against and
exclude religious individuals and institutions from a particular
locality.
23 8
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye seems to provide an answer
to this question by declaring that seemingly neutral laws with a
discriminatory purpose would violate the Free Exercise Clause.239 In
235. See id. at 24-25.
236. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532
(1993) (striking down a ban on animal sacrifice that was targeted at the Santeria faith).
237. See supra Part III.B.
238. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen.
Kennedy).
239. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 534.
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that case, the Court found that the legislative and historical
background of the statute, combined with recent statements made by
the city council and residents at public hearings, indicated that the ban
on animal sacrifice was not enacted as a neutral law, but was instead
enacted to discriminate against individuals who adhere to the Santeria
faith. 240 The Court stated:
The Free Exercise Clause ... extends beyond facial
discrimination. The Clause 'forbids subtle departures
from neutrality,' and 'covert suppression of particular
religious beliefs.' Official action that targets religious
conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by
mere compliance with the requirement of facial
neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects against
governmental hostility which is masked as well as
overt.
24 1
When religious animus or stereotyping seems to play a dispositive role
in the decision-making process, courts should find a violation of the
Free Exercise Clause.
Here, too, there is the problem of an appropriate remedy since
the Court could not order the local government to permit construction
of an eruv in violation of the Establishment Clause. In this sense, the
law would seem to reward discriminating and stereotyping on the part
of local governments since, in the end, they would ultimately get what
they want: no eruv. However, this is not entirely true. If a local
government was found to have violated the Free Exercise Clause by
discriminating or stereotyping against Orthodox Jews, there would
likely be recourse through the political process and the press. While
not an ideal situation, a court cannot order a remedy for one
constitutional violation by ordering a violation of another
constitutional provision.
Under Employment Division and Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, a local government's decision to disallow an eruv after applying a
neutral law of general applicability that is equally enforced and is not
motivated by religious animus or stereotyping is constitutional even
though, undeniably, severe consequences for some Orthodox Jews
would inevitably ensue. Since Orthodox Jewish tradition necessitates
240. Brief for ACLU of New Jersey as Amicus Curiae, supra note 141, at 30-31
(discussing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 540-42).
24 1. Church of the Lukumi Babah Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 534 (internal citations omitted).
242. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
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congregational worship for its fullest expression, those unable to
attend temple, absent an eruv, are not permitted to worship in a manner
consistent with Jewish law.243 Thus, families with small children, the
disabled, or the elderly are bound to the private space of their homes,
unable to fully exercise their religion.
While this is a clear and unfortunate burden upon the practice
of Orthodox Judaism, it is one that the religion has put upon itself. The
ACLU explained that "[h]ere, the lack of an eruv is not government
coercion for observant Orthodox Jews to violate their beliefs, it simply
makes adhering to those beliefs more onerous because of the tenets of
the religion itself., 244 Surely, the government should not be in a
position to alleviate religious burdens internal to religions themselves.
"Government should only be required to alleviate burdens placed on
religion that [it] initially imposed through legislation or action" 245 and
not those restrictions that religious practice, history, or belief places on
its adherents.
The New Jersey Superior Court in 1996 case reached a similar
conclusion when, in a divorce proceeding, it refused to order a
husband to provide his ex-wife with a "get," a bill of Jewish divorce
necessary if the wife were to remarry under Jewish Law.246 The court
stated:
It may seem "unfair" that Henry may ultimately refuse
to provide a "get." But the unfairness comes from
Sondra's own sincerely-held religious beliefs. When
she entered into the "ketubah" [marriage contract] she
agreed to be obligated to the laws of Moses and
Israel .... That was Sondra's choice and one which can
hardly be remedied by this court.
2 4 7
The purpose of American law is not to accommodate Rabbinic
law or to bridge a gap between the two. Thus, government denial of an
eruv under a neutral law of general applicability, equally enforced
without religious animus or stereotyping, would not be a violation of
the Free Exercise Clause.
243. For further discussion of Jewish practice, see supra notes 39-43 and accompanying
text.
244. Brief for ACLU of New Jersey as Amicus Curiae, supra note 141, at 23.
245. See Metzger, supra note 8, at 88.
246. Brief for ACLU of New Jersey as Amicus Curiae, supra note 141, at 21 (discussing
Aflalo v. Aflalo, 295 N.J. Super. 527 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996)). See also Metzger,
supra note 8, at 87 n. 151 (discussing the New York get statute and the debate surrounding it).
247. Aflalo, 295 N.J. Super. at 542.
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C. The Eruv and RLUIPA
If an Orthodox Jewish community were denied permission to
build an eruv, it could bring a claim under RLUIPA stating that the
local government was imposing a substantial burden on Orthodox
Judaism by not allowing them to use public land to construct their
eruv. A court analyzing the claim would first need to determine if an
eruv should be seen as regulating land use for the purposes of the Act.
When a local government either allows or disallows the use of power
lines and utility poles on public land, and leases, or refuses to lease,
public property to any group, it is regulating land use.24 8 Because an
eruv requires the use of public property and a government
proclamation in order to be valid under Jewish law,249 an eruv would
fall within the realm of RLUIPA.
A court analyzing a RLUIPA claim would then need to
determine if RLUIPA applies to the particular government decision.
RLUIPA only applies when a government "makes, or has in place
formal or informal procedures or practices that permit [it] to make,
individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property
involved.,, 250 That is, RLUIPA addresses any land use restrictions that
involve discretionary judgments by local officials. If the government
were merely applying a neutral law of general applicability that
disallowed any attachments on utility poles, RLUIPA would not apply
and a traditional Employment Division rationale would deem the denial
of the eruv constitutional. 25' However, if the local government were
making ad hoc decisions regarding the use of utility poles or was
purporting to apply a neutral law, but was in fact selectively applying
it, as was the case with the Tenafly Borough Association, 25 RLUIPA
would apply because the officials were making discretionary
judgments. The local government would then have the burden of
demonstrating that its decision was necessitated by a compelling
government interest and that its actions aimed to further the
government interest in the least restrictive means.
253
Since the Free Exercise Clause would be violated if a local
government were engaging in ad hoc determinations motivated by
248. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen.
Kennedy).
249. See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2000).
25 1. See supra Part IV.A for a discussion of Employment Div..
252. See supra Part IV.B for a discussion of the Tenafly eruv debate.
253. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(l) (2000).
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religious discrimination or stereotyping under the guise of applying
neutral laws regulating land use, 25 a RLUIPA claim would appear to
be redundant. However, RLUIPA has real power if one reads it as
forcing local governments to allow religious land use, specifically, the
construction of an eruv, in the absence of a neutral law of general
applicability. For those local governments that have no law restricting
use of utility wires or poles, or for those jurisdictions that often permit
variances or special use permits, the language of RLUIPA would
require local governments to establish an eruv because RLUIPA would
not allow individualized determinations that burden religious practice,
even if that burdening was not the intent of the local government.
A controversy over an eruv in Palo Alto, California is
illustrative in highlighting the power of RLUIPA. In that case, after a
prolonged eruv debate within the community between proponents and
opponents of the eruv, the city proposed a compromise in which it
would allow the eruv supporters to paint white lines on the utility poles
to represent the continuous enclosure of the eruv to circumvent the ban
on any foreign pole attachments.255 However, the Council had always
permitted a variance from this ban in the shopping district for purposes
of decoration during the holiday season. 256 The Palo Alto rabbi
heading the movement for an eruv said the compromise was
unworkable under Jewish law and that his congregants "'will look with
pretty bitter irony on other attachments on lampposts from season to
season.
' ' 257
If the Orthodox Jewish community in Palo Alto decided to
bring an RLUIPA claim, it would likely succeed. The Council would
likely argue that the holiday decorations are temporary, while an eruv
is permanent, and that the decorations enhance commerce during the
holidays and have no religious significance. Nevertheless, a court
would not likely find these compelling under the stringent RLUIPA
standard, which requires strict scrutiny for ad hoc determinations
regarding land use that burdens a particular religion.2 58 That the eruv
has religious significance in fact privileges it in an RLUIPA analysis.
However, what if a local government denied the Orthodox
Jewish community's request for permission to construct and maintain
an eruv on the grounds that granting such permission would be a
254. See supra Part IV.A.
255. Marcella Bernhard, City Council: Rabbi Blasts Eruv Compromise, PALO ALTO
WEEKLY, July 28, 2000.
256. See id.
257. Id.
258. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2000).
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violation of the Establishment Clause? It is uncertain whether a local
government could satisfy strict scrutiny if it claimed its compelling
interest was to avoid a violation of the Establishment Clause. RLUIPA
states that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to affect,
interpret, or in any way address that portion of the first amendment to
the Constitution prohibiting laws respecting an establishment of
religion., 25 9 Thus, it would appear that since the eruv is a violation of
the Establishment Clause under both the Lemon test and the symbolic
endorsement test,26° RLUIPA would not mandate a local government
to allow the construction and maintenance of an eruv.
If RLUIPA did necessitate an eruv, despite its violation of the
Establishment Clause, it would create a significant legal dilemma for
local governments deciding whether or not to allow an eruv. That is, if
a local government allowed an eruv, it would open itself to an
Establishment Clause claim, but if it disallowed it, an Orthodox Jewish
community could sue under an RLUIPA claim.26' In order to avoid
this paradox, courts should analyze RLUIPA as if it is consistent with
the Establishment Clause, thereby avoiding the dilemma of requiring
an eruv despite the fact that it is an unconstitutional establishment. If a
local government denies a request for an eruv because it violates the
Establishment Clause, the courts should find this to be a compelling
262government purpose that satisfies strict scrutiny.
V. CONCLUSION
A local government's allowance of an eruv, which converts the
public domain into the private domain and into the property of the
Orthodox Jewish community, is a violation of the Establishment
Clause of the Constitution. A local government that disallows an eruv
259. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-4 (2000).
260. See supra Part III.B.
261. This tension is usually discussed in relation to the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. However, in the case of the
eruv, this tension is not present unless a local government was selectively applying a neutral
law to disallow an eruv or was motivated by animus or stereotyping. See supra Part IV.B.
Where a local government is simply applying its neutral law of general applicability, there is
no Free Exercise violation. See id.
262. Needless to say, this is probably not the case since strict scrutiny is almost always
fatal to the law under examination. This is particularly troubling since RLUIPA's strict
scrutiny itself is, in effect, a violation of the Establishment Clause. That is, through its
privileging of religion, it fails the second prong of the Lemon test. See Sager, supra note 196,
at 15 ("[RLUIPA] is a bald and rather extreme privileging of churches for which no
justification is available . . . . [It] is wholly inconsistent with the best understanding of
religious liberty, which centers on the norm of equal regard.").
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under a neutral law of general applicability, consistently applied, does
not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution or RLUIPA.
If, however, a local government disallows an eruv by applying a
seemingly neutral law in an unequal manner, or is motivated by
religious discrimination or stereotyping, it violates the Free Exercise
Clause and RLUIPA.
Since courts and commentators have failed to thoroughly
analyze eruvim or articulate a consistent legal framework, local
governments, opponents and proponents of them have had little
guidance in making their decisions. Although it is understandable that
courts, local governments, and scholars have been sensitive to the
burdens imposed on Orthodox Jewish worship absent an eruv, their
analyses have glossed over the problematic constitutional aspects of
eruvim, thus appearing to be results-oriented in holding that an eruv is
constitutionally permissible. It is not the role of American law to
alleviate the internal burdens of Orthodox Judaism or any religion. It is
the role of the courts and local governments to uphold the Constitution
and safeguard all citizens' rights to be free from religion.
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Appendix I
Los Angeles Community Eruv Boundaries
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Appendix H
(From Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d
142, 147-48 (D.N.J. 2001))
PROCLAMATION
WHEREAS, in accordance with the Jewish Orthodox faith the law of
the Sabbath contains commandments prohibiting the pushing and
carrying of articles on the Sabbath and other Jewish holy days in the
public domain except within certain specified conditions; and
WHEREAS, the delineation of an eruv and its construction creates the
legal fiction of a private domain in which observant persons of the
Jewish faith are permitted to carry or push objects from place to place
within the defined area during the Sabbath and other holy days; and
WHEREAS, the office of the Bergen County Executive has been
petitioned by the Tenafly Eruv Association, Inc., on behalf of those of
the Jewish faith who reside within the County of Bergen, bounded by
Booth Avenue and Tenafly Road in Englewood; the Borough of
Tenafly; Madison Avenue, Knickerbocker Road and Truman Drive in
Cresskill; to rent according to Jewish law, to the Tenafly Eruv
Association, Inc, for a period of 30 (thirty) years at a rental rate of one
dollar ($ 1.00), in hand paid, the rights to the aforesaid area for the
sole purpose of carrying and/or pushing articles on the Sabbath and
Jewish holy days; and
WHEREAS, the office of the Bergen County Executive deems it to be
in the public interest of those of its residents for whom the petition has
been presented be granted the rights described in the petition; Now
therefore,
I, WILLIAM P. SCHUBER
Executive of the County of Bergen, New Jersey do hereby proclaim
Wednesday, December 15, 1999 as,
A GRANT OF RIGHTS IN BERGEN COUNTY
The said eruv shall not be valid or binding for any other purpose and
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this proclamation creates no rights, duties or obligations enforceable in
any court whether in law or in equity. This proclamation shall not
diminish, increase or affect any other rights granted under New Jersey
law, nor shall it be deemed to authorize any physical construction that
would otherwise require permission from any local municipal, county
or state boards.
The Bergen Proclamation is typical of the ceremonial proclamations
establishing eruvs in other municipalities, such as: Washington, D.C.;
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Baltimore, Maryland; Cincinnati, Ohio;
Charleston, South Carolina; and Jacksonville, Florida.
